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WHOSE FAULT IS IT ANYWAY?: ANALYZING THE ROLE 
“FAULT” PLAYS IN THE DIVISION OF PREMARITAL 
PROPERTY IF MARRIAGE DOES NOT ENSUE 
Arielle L. Murphy+ 
A professional basketball player and a beautiful socialite fall in love.  He gives 
her a twenty-carat diamond ring to express his intention to marry, and they 
believe their love will never end.  But if it does, after only 72 days of marriage, 
what happens next? 
From 2011 to 2013, Kris Humphries and Kim Kardashian engaged in a highly 
publicized battle about who would keep the diamond ring after the dissolution 
of their marriage.1  Eventually, Ms. Kardashian quietly returned the ring to her 
ex-husband,2  but was he legally entitled to it? 
The tradition of giving a ring in anticipation of marriage dates back to the 
Egyptian empire.3  Egyptian men placed a ring on “the third finger of [their 
bride’s] left hand,”4  which “we now know as the ring finger.”5  They believed 
                                                            
 + J.D. Candidate, May 2015, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law; B.A., 
2010, Syracuse University.  The author would like to thank the staff and editors of the Catholic 
University Law Review for their tremendous work in bringing this Comment to publication and 
Professor Geoffrey R. Watson for his helpful feedback throughout the writing process.  She would 
also like to extend a sincere thank you to her parents, Rich and Karen, for their guidance and 
constant encouragement.  Finally, she would like to thank her husband, James, for his love and 
support through life and his lack of insecurity when she decided to write about failed engagements 
during their own. 
 1. See THR Staff, Kris Humphries Auctions Off Kim Kardashian’s Engagement Ring, 
HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (Oct. 16, 2013), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/kris-
humphries-auctions-kim-kardashians-648944 (discussing the facts of the couple’s marriage 
dissolution battle). 
 2. Justin Ravitz, Kim Kardashian’s Engagement Ring from Kris Humphries Sells at Auction 
for $749,000, US WEEKLY (Oct. 15, 2013, 2:40 PM), http://www.usmagazine.com/celebrity-
style/news/kim-kardashians-ring-from-kris-humphries-sells-at-auction-for-620000-20131510; 
Maureen O’Connor, Kim Kardashian’s Cursed Engagement Ring for Sale, NEW YORK MAG. (Sept. 
12, 2013, 11:19 AM), http://nymag.com/thecut/2013/09/kim-kardashians-cursed-engagement-
ring-for-sale.html. 
 3. See Stefano Rapisarda, Note, A Ring on the Little Finger: Andreas Capellanus and 
Medieval Chiromancy, 69 J. WARBURG & COURTAULD INST. 175, 177 (2006) (providing an 
overview of the Egyptian origins of the ring tradition and its influence today); see also BETHANNE 
PATRICK & JOHN THOMPSON, AN UNCOMMON HISTORY OF COMMON THINGS 81 (2009) (relating 
the history of the engagement ring back to the ancient Egyptians and Romans). 
 4. See PATRICK & THOMPSON, supra note 3, at 81 (discussing the Egyptian and Roman 
tradition of placing “wedding rings on [the third] finger”). 
 5. Reno Charlton, The History of Engagement Rings and Wedding Bands, EZINE ARTICLES 
(Mar. 31, 2005), http://ezinearticles.com/?The-History-of-Engagement-Rings-and-Wedding-
Bands&id=24579 (stating the significance of the “fourth finger,” which is what is often referred to 
as the “ring finger” if the thumb is counted). 
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this finger “was connected to the vena amoris that led directly to the heart.”6  
Roman men gave their bride a metal ring, which symbolized ownership more so 
than love.7  In more modern history, European royalty initiated the custom of 
gifting luxurious engagement rings to their betrothed.8  The first recorded gifting 
of a diamond ring as a symbol of impending marriage was by Archduke 
Maximilian of Austria in 1477, who announced his engagement to Mary of 
Burgundy by giving her a diamond ring.9 
At the turn of the twentieth century, diamonds became significantly more 
affordable due to the discovery of an abundant supply in South Africa, which 
enabled more men to afford diamond rings for their future wives.10  In twentieth-
century America, a man would give an engagement ring to a woman for financial 
security rather than affection, because if one party broke off the engagement, she 
had little chance of finding another man to provide for her.11 
In today’s lucrative wedding industry, Americans spend a significant amount 
of money each year on engagement rings and wedding bands in anticipation of 
marriage.12  The amount of money spent often leads to disputes between the 
                                                            
 6. PATRICK & THOMPSON, supra note 3, at 81; see also Rapisarda, supra note 3, at 177 
(exploring the origin of the ring finger tradition in antiquity). 
 7. Charlton, supra note 5; see also Dave Padgett, The Complete History of the Engagement 
Ring (Part 2), D & R HOUSE DIAMONDS (July 5, 2013), http://www.dandrhouseofdiamonds.com/ 
the-complete-history-of-the-engagement-ring-part-2/ (“The difference between Roman and 
Egyptian wedding bands was [Roman bands] were also a symbol of ownership not just love.”). 
 8. Engagement Rings . . . Their Long and Bright History, THE HOUR (Norwalk), Feb. 3, 
1979, at 27, available at http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1916&dat=19790203&id= 
KOcgAAAAIBAJ&sjid=FW4FAAAAIBAJ&pg=1458,877997 (discussing the history of diamond 
engagement rings, including Queen Victoria’s impact on their growth and design in the United 
States). 
 9. Id.; see also Brooke A. Blecher, Broken Engagements: Who Is Entitled to the Engagement 
Ring?, 34 FAM. L.Q. 579, 579 (2000) (“Ever since the fifteenth century when Archduke Maximilan 
of Austria gave Mary of Burgundy a gold ring with diamonds, brides-to-be have been enthralled 
with diamond rings.”). 
 10. See Eric Goldschein, The Incredible Story of How DeBeers Created and Lost the Most 
Powerful Monopoly Ever, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 19, 2011, 2:00 PM), http://www.business 
insider.com/history-of-de-beers-2011-12?op=1 (analyzing the impact that the South African 
diamond discovery had on the American diamond industry and the increased marketing of the 
engagement ring); see also COLIN NEWBURY, THE DIAMOND RING: BUSINESS, POLITICS, AND 
PRECIOUS STONES IN SOUTH AFRICA, 1867–1947 1 (1989); Margaret F. Brinig, Rings and 
Promises, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 203, 203–04 (1990) (discussing the increased availability of 
diamond rings following the discovery of diamond mines in South Africa in 1880). 
 11. See Brinig, supra note 10, at 204–05 (discussing the economics of marriage and relating 
the loss in financial security to the woman’s loss of her virginity). See also REBECCA ROSS 
RUSSELL, GENDER AND JEWELRY: A FEMINIST ANALYSIS 119–22 (2010) (analyzing how women 
have used jewelry as means of monetary security in cases where their husband dies or leaves them, 
and how “jewelry and gemstones [were] their main method of banking value and to ensure their 
own financial security” because traditionally, women were not entitled to inherit wealth or property 
directly). 
 12. The Wedding Report, BRIDAL ASS’N AM. (2006), http://www.bridalassociationof 
america.com/Wedding_Statistics/#costbreakdown.  In 2006, the Bridal Association of America 
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parties when the engagement is broken prior to marriage, and these disputes may 
require litigation to be resolved.13 
Courts in the United States have struggled to come up with an equitable and 
consistent method of determining which party is entitled to property 
accumulated in anticipation of marriage.14  Often, the central issue combines 
property law, contract law, and family law to determine the party that should 
retain the ring after the engagement’s dissolution.15  Courts have generally 
treated engagement rings and gifts made in contemplation of marriage 
differently from other “gifts”—but the question has been, and to an extent 
remains, should they?16 
Until the middle of the twentieth century, most states incorporated “breach-
of-promise” lawsuits into family law jurisprudence, allowing a man or woman 
to seek damages against the person who broke his or her promise to marry.17  
                                                            
conducted a study to determine the amount of money spent on weddings each year in the United 
States. Id. They found that the average American groom spends $4,411 on an engagement ring, 
totaling $10,025,526,238 per a year. Id.  Additionally, the average American couple spends $2,067 
on wedding bands, totaling $4,697,891,064 per year.  Id.  The amount spent on weddings bands 
each year totals $4,697,891,064. Id. 
 13. See, e.g., Thorndike v. Demirs, No. CV055000243S, 2007 WL 2363411, at *1 (Conn. 
Super. Ct. July 26, 2007) (discussing difficulties inherent to litigating lawsuits where a hotly 
contested item, such as an engagement ring, is at issue). 
 14. See Aronow v. Silver, 538 A.2d 851, 852–54 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987) (stating that 
there is a split amongst courts regarding “the disposition of engagement rings” that revolves around 
the importance of “fault”). 
 15. See, e.g., Albinger v. Harris, 48 P.3d 711, 716–22 (Mont. 2002) (using the property law 
subset of gifts to determine that an engagement ring is an irrevocable inter vivos gift, and aspects 
of contract law, such as unjust enrichment, to conclude that the donee is entitled to keep the ring 
regardless of the fault of the parties); Vigil v. Haber, 888 P.2d 455, 457 (N.M. 1994) (looking to 
New Mexico’s no-fault policy in the divorce context to establish that the fault policy is an outdated 
method of determining which party is entitled to keep the engagement ring); Lindh v. Surman, 742 
A.2d 643, 645 (Pa. 1999) (using contract law and property law to find that “the giving of an 
engagement gift [has] an implied condition that the marriage must occur in order to vest title in the 
donee; mere acceptance of the marriage proposal is not the implied condition for the gift”).  
Additionally, the court in Vigil wrote, “[f]ollowing a modern trend, legislatures and courts have 
moved toward a policy that removes fault-finding from the personal-relationship dynamics of 
marriage and divorce.”  Vigil, 888 P.2d at 457.  See also Barbara Frazier, Comment, “But I Can’t 
Marry You”: Who Is Entitled to the Engagement Ring When the Conditional Performance Falls 
Short of the Altar?, 17 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW. 419, 419 (2001) (“The ownership of 
gifts given to the other party during the engagement period is often an issue.”); Rebecca Tushnet, 
Note, Rules of Engagement, 107 YALE L.J. 2583, 2591 (1998) (“Engagement rings in particular 
have spurred much litigation, in part because they are the most common engagement gifts.”). 
 16. See Tushnet, supra note 15, at 2583–84, 2599–2607 (discussing the reasoning behind the 
courts’ tendencies to view engagement rings as conditional gifts rather than irrevocable inter vivos 
gifts).  See also Harris v. Davis, 487 N.E.2d 1204, 1206 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (stating that under 
Illinois law, “a gift given in contemplation of marriage is deemed to be conditional on the 
subsequent marriage of the parties”). 
 17. See MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN 
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 33–38 (1985) (discussing the availability of breach-of-promise 
suits to recover remedies sought by jilted fiancées).  See also GINGER S. FROST, PROMISES 
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During litigation, courts were forced to analyze why the engagement ended in 
order to investigate the “fault” of the parties involved and award any damages 
that resulted therefrom.18  Later courts imported the fault analysis used in 
breach-of-promise suits into cases brought to retain engagement rings.19  These 
breach-of-promise suits, which involved the court’s invasion into the romantic 
relationships of parties, were often referred to as “heartbalm suits.”20 
In response to this growing body of law from the judiciary, state legislators 
began passing an abundance of “antiheartbalm” statutes.21  Two factors 
particularly drove the movement: fear of the legal system’s excessive intrusion 
into the personal lives of litigants, and fear that women could purposefully court 
wealthy men who could later refuse to marry them just to bring a breach of 
promise to marry suit once the engagement ended.22  Courts also began to 
reconsider how to analyze suits in replevin to recover engagement rings.23  
Presently, the courts’ treatment of pre-engagement property can be grouped into 
three methodologies.24 
                                                            
BROKEN: COURTSHIP, CLASS, AND GENDER IN VICTORIAN ENGLAND 80–97 (1995) (describing 
the availability of similar remedies in nineteenth-century England). 
 18. See Meemken v. O’Hara, 66 N.W.2d 601, 603–04 (Minn. 1954) (holding that the plaintiff 
was entitled to damages resulting from a breach of the promise to marry by defendant, her supposed 
ex-fiancé, because defendant was at fault for the engagement’s termination since he refused to 
marry her after they had engaged in sexual intercourse and plaintiff had left her husband to marry 
him); Hahn v. Bettingen, 83 N.W. 467, 467–68 (Minn. 1900) (reversing the trial court’s finding 
that the woman could recover lost opportunity damages for a broken engagement because she was 
at fault for the original engagement that she ended to accept the defendant’s proposal); Trammell 
v. Vaughan, 59 S.W. 79, 81–82 (Mo. 1900) (holding that the woman could maintain a breach-of-
promise suit because the man’s behavior after contracting a venereal disease showed that he was at 
fault for the broken engagement and that he had never intended to marry the woman).  See also 
Robert C. Brown, Breach of Promise Suits, 77 U. PA. L. REV. 474, 474 (1929) (describing the 
breach-of-promise suit as a drama ready-made for the courtroom). 
 19. See, e.g., Beberman v. Segal, 69 A.2d 587, 587–88 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1949) (“[The 
engagement ring] can be recovered by the man, if the agreement to marry [was] dissolved by mutual 
consent, or the woman unjustifiably br[oke] off the engagement, but cannot be recovered by him if 
he unjustifiably br[oke] the agreement it evidences.” (citing Mate v. Abrahams, 62 A.2d 754, 754–
55 (N.J. Essex County Ct. 1948)); see also Mate, 62 A.2d at 754–55 (“When . . . the giver of the 
ring, betokening his promise, violates his word, it would seem that a similar result should follow, 
i.e., he should lose, not gain, rights to the ring.”). 
 20. See Tushnet, supra note 15, at 2586. 
 21. See id. (providing a history of the heartbalm suits and their development into the 
antiheartbalm statutes between 1930 and 1950). 
 22. See id. at 2586–87 (discussing the rise of anti-heartbalm acts due to a growing belief that 
“heartbalm actions attracted undue attention”). See also Brown, supra note 18, at 491–93 (“[T]here 
is nothing to prevent the plaintiff from concocting a case out of her own head, and supporting it by 
unblushing perjury.”). 
 23. See Tushnet, supra note 15, at 2591–92 (analyzing engagement ring suits in the anti-
heartbalm era and the introduction of property and contract law to the judicial analysis). 
 24. See David M. Cotter, This Diamond Ring Doesn’t Shine for Me Anymore: Who Is Entitled 
to Possession of Engagement Presents When No Marriage Occurs, 14 DIVORCE LITIG. 148, 156 
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Under the first method, the “fault approach,” the court scrutinizes the facts to 
determine which party was at fault in the engagement’s termination.25  Under 
the second method, the no-fault approach in favor of the donor, the court does 
not factor into its analysis the reason the engagement ends, but returns the ring 
to the original owner.26  Under the third method, the no-fault approach in favor 
of the donee, the court views the ring as an inter vivos gift, which allows the 
party who received the ring to keep it.27  With neither Supreme Court precedent 
nor a federal statute to consult, states continue to disagree on how to resolve this 
issue.28 
This Comment analyzes how different states divide property accumulated in 
anticipation of marriage, with a specific focus on the engagement ring.  Part I of 
this Comment compares the fault approach traditionally employed by some 
states with the no-fault approach, which recently became the predominant 
method in the United States.  Next, Part II of this Comment analyzes the three 
rationales currently used by U.S. courts and balances their benefits and failures.  
Part III of this Comment evidences that a no-fault approach, in favor of the 
donor, best serves the interests of fairness, privacy, predictability, and justice.  
Ultimately, this Comment argues that the states should adopt a liberal, no-fault 
approach, with exceptions for extraordinary circumstances, such as 
unconscionability. 
                                                            
(2002) (acknowledging the three possible rules that courts will apply to lawsuits over engagement 
rings from failed engagements). 
 25. See, e.g., Stienback v. Halsey, 251 P.2d 1008, 1011–13 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1953) 
(discussing the various faults of respective parties in the termination of their betrothal and how 
these behaviors factor into the award from the court); Harris v. Davis, 487 N.E.2d 1204, 1205–06 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (stating that there is no question the defendant ended the engagement, which 
entitles the plaintiff to the value of the ring); Ricketts v. Duble, 177 So. 838, 840–41 (La. Ct. App. 
1938) (discussing how the facts surrounding the termination of the engagement led to the ultimate 
judgment that the ring was to be returned to the donor). 
 26. See Fierro v. Hoel, 465 N.W.2d 669, 670–72 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990) (discussing the states 
that apply the no-fault approach in favor of the donor). 
 27. Albinger v. Harris, 48 P.3d 711, 716–22 (Mont. 2002) (determining that, under Montana 
law, the donee is always entitled to the engagement ring, no matter which party caused the 
engagement’s failure). 
 28. Compare Harris, 478 N.E.2d at 1206 (holding that the plaintiff was entitled to the 
engagement ring because the defendant was at fault for the marriage not occurring, and stating that 
because “defendant failed to perform on the condition of the gift . . . [he] had no right either to 
retain the ring or to dispose of it”), with Heiman v. Parrish, 942 P.2d 631, 635–38 (Kan. 1997) 
(analyzing multiple cases in the no-fault line of reasoning to reach the conclusion that “fault is 
ordinarily not relevant to the question of who should have ownership and possession of an 
engagement ring after the engagement is broken”). 
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I. COURTS HAVE SHIFTED THEIR APPROACH ON ENGAGEMENT RING SUITS 
FROM VIEWING THE RING AS AN INTER VIVOS GIFT TO A CONDITIONAL GIFT 
WITH A NO-FAULT ANALYSIS 
A. The Decline of the Tranditional View of an Engagement Ring as an Inter 
Vivos Gift Created the Modern View of the Engagement Ring as a Conditional 
Gift 
1. The Engagement Ring as an Irrevocable Inter Vivos Gift 
Until the early- to mid-twentieth century, most American courts considered 
an engagement ring to be the same as any other gift exchanged between people.29  
Most early-twentieth-century courts in the United States held that, unless the 
engagement’s failure rested absolutely with the donee, the donee was entitled to 
the ring.30  Courts utilized the traditional elements of an inter vivos gift to 
determine if an engagement ring met the definition of a gift and, therefore, could 
be labeled irrevocable.31  As a matter of law, 
[t]o make a valid inter vivos gift the donor must intend to make an 
irrevocable present transfer of ownership, there must be a delivery of 
the gift, either by a physical delivery of the subject of the gift or a 
constructive or symbolic delivery, and there must be acceptance by the 
donee.”32 
Under this analysis, courts were often forced to consider whether the donor 
intended to make an irrevocable gift or a gift conditioned upon the marriage 
taking place.33 
                                                            
 29. See, e.g., Bolen v. Humes, 114 N.E.2d 281, 283–84 (Oh. Ct. App. 1951) (awarding the 
fiancée possession of the ring based on the irrevocability of the gift); Chipman’s Adm’r v. Gerlach, 
150 S.W.2d 633, 634–35 (Ky. Ct. App. 1941) (using traditional gift law to discuss the validity of 
the delivery of an engagement ring that had been given to deceased’s betrothed). See also CAL. 
CIV. CODE § 1590 (West 2014) (stating that a gift given “on the basis or assumption that the 
marriage will take place” must be returned “in the event that the donee refuses to enter into the 
marriage as contemplated”). 
 30. See supra note 18 and accompanying text (discussing multiple cases in which fault was 
used to determine which party was entitled to the engagement ring and awarding the donee the ring 
unless she had explicitly ended the engagement).  See also CAL. CIV. CODE § 1590 (codifying the 
idea that a donee’s fault may require the return of the engagement ring); Schultz v. Duitz, 69 S.W.2d 
27, 30 (Ky. Ct. App. 1934) (allowing the donee to keep the engagement ring because she was not 
at fault in terminating the engagement). 
 31. See, e.g., Bolen, 114 N.E.2d at 284–85 (“[A] completed gift inter vivos is irrevocable by 
the donor.”). 
 32. Greene v. Greene, 92 A.D.3d 838, 839 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (quoting Ross v. Ross Metals Corp., 87 A.D.3d 573, 575) (N.Y. App. Div. 2011) ; see also 
Albinger, 48 P.3d at 718 (“The essential elements of an inter vivos gift are donative intent, voluntary 
delivery and acceptance by the recipient.” (citing Marans v. Newland, 374 P.2d 721, 724 (Mont. 
1962))). 
 33. See Coppola v. Farina, 910 A.2d 1011, 1014–15 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2006) (quoting Pappas 
v. Pappas, 386 S.E.2d 301, 303 (S.C. Ct. App. 1989) (“Rarely will the donor’s intent be clearly 
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During the early-twentieth century, most disputes involving premarital 
property were handled through breach-of-promise to marry suits.34  Due to 
shifting societal views regarding marriage and a woman’s role within the context 
of a marriage, many thought these causes of action were outdated, and most 
states soon abolished them.35  The state legislation that prohibited breach-of-
promise suits became collectively known as “Heartbalm Acts,” which changed 
the landscape for how to resolve issues of broken engagements.36  While these 
heartbalm acts barred a suit for damages based on a breach of promise to marry, 
they did not bar an action for the recovery in replevin of a gift given in 
anticipation of marriage.37  The feminist movement also helped shape the change 
because increased entry into the workplace meant that women could make their 
own living without needing a husband.38  These factors combined to modernize 
                                                            
established.  The family court is then reduced to deciding the question on the credibility of the 
parties unless an additional rule is adopted.”)). 
 34. See Brian L. Kruckenburg, Comment, “I Don’t”: Determining Ownership of the 
Engagement Ring When the Engagement Terminates, 37 WASHBURN L.J. 425, 428 (1998) (footnote 
omitted).  See also supra note 19 and accompanying text (listing breach-of-promise suits). 
 35. See Kruckenburg, supra note 34, at 428–29; Neil G. Williams, What to Do When There’s 
No “I Do”: A Model for Awarding Damages Under Promissory Estoppel, 70 WASH. L. REV. 1019, 
1031–32 (1995) (“The criticisms of the breach-of-promise action fueled the legislative reform 
movement that led to the adoption of heartbalm statutes in some American jurisdictions.”); Tushnet, 
supra note 15, at 2586 (“From the 1930s through the 1950s, a wave of antiheartbalm proposals 
swept the United States.  Responding to charges that [breach-of-promise] actions enabled designing 
women to blackmail worthy men, legislators in many states passed statutes eliminating breach-of-
promise and related actions.”). 
 36. See HOMER H. CLARK, JR., 1 THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 
§ 1.5, at 21–23 (2d ed. 1987).  See also Kruckenburg, supra note 34, at 429 n.31 (“As of 1997, 
twenty-one states still have “Heart-Balm” statutes in effect . . . .”). 
 37. See Piccininni v. Hajus, 429 A.2d 886, 888 (Conn. 1980) (stating that the majority rule 
holds that “the existence of a Heart Balm Act does not affect common law principles governing a 
gift to a fiancee [sic] made on condition of marriage, which condition is broken by the donee”); 
Vann v. Vehrs, 633 N.E.2d 102, 104 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (concluding that the majority of courts 
state that because a suit for the return of premarital property is not a suit for breach of promise to 
marry, “[Heartbalm] statutes do not apply to replevin actions for the recovery of property 
transferred in contemplation of marriage”); Gikas v. Nicholis, 71 A.2d 785, 786 (N.H. 1950) (“It 
was not the intention of the . . . [l]egislature in outlawing breach of promise suits to permit the 
unjust enrichment of persons to whom property had been transferred . . . . To so construe the statute 
would be to permit the unjust enrichment which the statute [was] designed to prevent.”); Lampus 
v. Lampus, 660 A.2d 1308, 1310 (Pa. 1995) (holding that heartbalm acts do not eliminate suits in 
replevin to recover premarital property when the marriage does not occur, but only abolished causes 
of action for the breach of the actual promise to marry). 
 38. See LLOYD T. KELSO, 1 N.C. FAMILY LAW PRACTICE § 2:17 (West 2014) (“The entry of 
women into employment markets formerly occupied only by men meant that women were no longer 
defined exclusively by domestic roles. . . . As a result of these changes in laws and social attitudes, 
victims of broken promises of marriage no longer suffered the same economic and societal costs as 
did engaged women of an earlier time.”). 
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courts’ views when resolving property disputes in broken engagement suits, 
sparking the increased use of the conditional gift theory.39 
2. The Engagement Ring as a Conditional Gift 
As breach of promise to marry laws became passé, so too did the courts’ 
inclination to regard engagement rings in the same light as other gifts.40  In the 
emerging trend, a court regarded an engagement ring as a conditional gift 
because this approach more appropriately represented the true intent of the donor 
at the time he bestowed the “gift” on the donee.41  The added element required 
to declare a gift conditional, as opposed to inter vivos, was that the gift was given 
under the condition that an event was to occur, and if the event did not actually 
materialize, the gift was revocable.42  In engagement ring suits, this condition 
                                                            
 39. See, e.g., Pavlicic v. Vogtsberger, 136 A.2d 127, 130 (Pa. 1957) (ruling that heartbalm 
acts left conditional gift theory intact because “[a] gift given by a man to a woman on condition 
that she embark on the sea of matrimony with him is no different from a gift based on the condition 
that the donee sail on any other sea”).  See also Tushnet, supra note 15, at 2592–93 (describing 
effects that the heartbalm reforms and change in societal gender norms had on growing conditional 
gift theory). 
 40. See Kruckenburg, supra note 34, at 428 (“At the beginning of this century, the attitudes 
toward engagement began changing, and as a result, the breach of promise to marry action became 
the object of harsh criticism.”).  See also Tushnet, supra note 15, at 2592–93, 2599–2607 (analyzing 
the rise of the conditional gift theory in premarital engagement suits).  After examining the 
evolution of premarital property suits in the United States, one scholar reasoned that the recent 
trend for courts to utilize a no-fault approach generated from “the theory that a ring is given 
conditioned on marriage and that it has to be returned if the marriage fails to materialize.”  Id.  This 
condition allegedly distinguishes engagement rings from other gifts shared between romantic 
partners.  Id. 
 41. See Brown v. Thomas, 379 N.W.2d 868, 872–73 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985).  While discussing 
the difference between an inter vivos gift and a conditional gift, this court stated: 
Where a gift of personal property is made with the intent to take effect irrevocably, and 
is fully executed by unconditional delivery, it is a valid gift inter vivos.  Such a gift is 
absolute and, once made, cannot be revoked.  A gift, however, may be conditioned on 
the performance of some act by the donee, and if the condition is not fulfilled the donor 
may recover the gift.  We find the conditional gift theory particularly appropriate when 
the contested property is an engagement ring. 
Id. at 872 (citations omitted). 
 42. See 38 AM. JUR. 2D Gifts § 68 (2010) (providing the understanding of conditional gift 
theory from the viewpoint of premarital property).  Case law also supports the assertion that 
engagement rings inherently represent a conditional gift.  Meyer v. Mitnick, 625 N.W.2d 136, 139 
(Mich. Ct. App. 2001) (“[W]e find that engagement rings should be considered, by their very 
nature, conditional gifts given in contemplation of marriage.”); Aronow v. Silver, 538 A.2d 851, 
852 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987) (describing the engagement ring as a conditional gift despite 
the absence of an express condition); McIntire v. Raukhorst, 585 N.E.2d 456, 457–58 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 1989) (basing the belief that engagement rings qualify as conditional gifts on their “symbolic 
significance”); Lindh v. Surman, 742 A.2d 643, 644 (Pa. 1999) (“Pennsylvania law treats the giving 
of an engagement ring as a conditional gift.” (citing Pavlicic v. Vogtsberger, 136 A.2d 127 (Pa. 
1957))). 
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was the marriage’s actual occurrence.43  Some courts have decided that the 
giving of an engagement ring has “an implied condition that the marriage must 
occur in order [for property rights in the ring] to vest in the donee; mere 
acceptance of the marriage proposal [cannot be] the implied condition for the 
gift.”44  This approach, which uses contract law to provide a basis for viewing 
engagement rings as conditional gifts, is in accordance with both existing law 
and the donor’s intent.45 
Furthermore, this approach separates the revocability of gifts traditionally 
given in anticipation of marriage, such as an engagement ring, from gifts that do 
not necessarily condition themselves on the marriage occurring, such as buying 
a home.46  This approach also distinguishes the revocability of the gift based on 
when it was given.47  Courts have held that an engagement ring given on 
Christmas or a birthday is an irrevocable gift, not one conditioned upon 
marriage, as the donor more likely intended those as “personal gratuities.”48 
                                                            
 43. See Harris v. Davis, 478 N.E.2d 1204, 1206 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (citing Rockafellow v. 
Newcomb, 57 Ill. 186, 191–92 (Ill. 1870) (“[A] gift given in contemplation of marriage is deemed 
to be conditional on the subsequent marriage of the parties.”); Cooper v. Smith, 800 N.E.2d 372, 
378 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003) (adopting the conditional gift theory with regard to engagement rings in 
Ohio because the approach “implies a condition on the gift of the engagement ring only, [and] is 
the best approach”); see also Lewis v. Permut, 320 N.Y.S.2d 408, 410 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1971) (“Such 
a gift was predicated upon the parties entering into marriage . . . .  Since this did not happen, despite 
who broke off the engagement, the court cannot see any logic in allowing the defendant to retain 
such unhappy souvenirs of an event which was never consummated.”). 
 44. Lindh, 742 A.2d at 645. 
 45. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 332 (1981) (“An assignment is gratuitous 
unless it is given or taken . . . in exchange for a performance or return promise that would be 
consideration for a promise . . . .”).  Therefore, the Restatement understood the equitable need for 
the revocability of a conditional gift, or one given in exchange for a condition occurring, such as 
marriage. Id. at cmt. a. 
 46. See Lewis, 320 N.Y.S.2d at 411 (holding that a gold pocket watch and chain given by the 
defendant to the plaintiff was irrevocable when their engagement ended because “these items of 
jewelry are not of the same ilk as an engagement ring, which is the accepted and traditional symbol 
between a man and a woman of their intention to marry”); see also Cooper, 800 N.E.2d at 378–79 
(deciding that the law dictated the return of the engagement ring, but not the other pre-marital 
property).  In Cooper, the plaintiff sought the return of an engagement ring and other “gifts” he had 
given to his fiancée during their engagement, such as construction on her mother’s house.  Id. at 
374.  The court held that the plaintiff was entitled to the engagement ring’s return because the ring 
came with an implied condition that the marriage was going to occur.  Id. at 378.  However, the 
court concluded that the plaintiff was not entitled to any other gifts he had given his fiancée because 
“[u]nlike the engagement ring, the other gifts have no symbolic meaning.  Rather, they are merely 
‘token[s] of the love and affection which [the donor] bore for the [donee].’”  Id. at 378–79 
(alteration in original) (quoting Albanese v. Indelicato, 51 A.2d 110, 110 (Dist. Ct. N.J. 1947)). 
 47. See, e.g., Gikas v. Nicholis, 71 A.2d 785, 786 (N.H. 1950) (holding that the gifts plaintiff 
had given to his ex-fiancée were “personal gratuities” that were “more nearly akin to a Christmas 
present” than a gift with an implied condition, such as the engagement ring). 
 48. See Gikas, 71 A.2d at 786.  See also N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 4:4 (“If there were reasons 
other than a contemplated marriage why the gift was given, such as part of a birthday or holiday 
celebration, the ring may not be subject to return.”). 
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B. Modern Courts Utilize Three Approaches to Determine Cases Involving the 
Return of Engagement Rings 
1. The Fault Approach 
A minority of states, including California,49  Missouri,50  and Texas,51  allow 
fault to factor into the analysis when determining which party receives the 
engagement ring after a failed engagement.52  The hallmark of the fault approach 
is the thorough examination of the particular case’s facts to determine which 
party was at fault, or more at fault, in the engagement’s termination.53  This 
methodology aims to consider the facts of each case individually, a time-
consuming approach that often results in a court’s analysis of parties’ personal 
lives.54 
Although New Jersey now follows a no-fault approach,55  for decades it 
applied the fault approach first announced in the 1948 case Mate v. Abrahams.56  
The court in Mate argued: 
                                                            
 49. See e.g., Stienback v. Halsey, 251 P.2d 1008, 1010–12 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1953) 
(discussing CAL. CIV. CODE § 1590 and concluding that defendant was not entitled to keep her 
engagement ring because, even though she agreed to marry plaintiff, the facts showed she only 
agreed to do so to accumulate property and their engagement ended the plaintiff realized this 
information); see also CAL. CIV. CODE § 1590 (West 2014) (“Where either party to a contemplated 
marriage in this State makes a gift of money or property to the other on the basis or assumption that 
the marriage will take place, in the event that the donee refuses to enter into the marriage as 
contemplated . . . the donor may recover such gift . . . as may, under all of the circumstances of the 
case, be found by a court or jury to be just.”). 
 50. See Clippard v. Pfefferkorn, 168 S.W.3d 616, 620 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that the 
woman was entitled to keep the engagement ring after her fiancé broke off the engagement due to 
no fault of her own). 
 51. See Curtis v. Anderson, 106 S.W.3d 251, 256 (Tex. Ct. App. 2003) (finding that assessing 
fault for both parties in conjunction with the conditional-gift rule allowed the donee to keep the 
engagement ring when the donor terminated the engagement). 
 52. See supra notes 50–51 (showing courts’ analyses of the minority approach). 
 53. See supra note 25. 
 54. See Kosco v. Giacone, No. 5-12-0483, 2013 WL 4041043, at *1–4 (Ill. App. Ct. Aug. 8, 
2013) (examining personal details of the parties’ lives, such as behavior during phone calls, 
arguments about engagement photos, and the intimate details about past breakups).  It is often clear 
that a state follows a fault approach based on the length of the opinions in broken-engagement suits 
because the courts must analyze and interpret a multitude of facts.  See Thorndike v. Demirs, No. 
CV055000243S, 2007 WL 2363411, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 26, 2007) (acknowledging the 
vehement discord and disagreement between the parties’ testimony regarding the facts in this case, 
but due to the inherent importance in determining which party was the credible party, the court 
gave “considerable attention to the respective testimony of the parties”). 
 55. See Aronow v. Silver, 538 A.2d 851, 852 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987) (concluding that 
New Jersey should join the handful of states that followed a no-fault approach at the time of the 
opinion). 
 56. 62 A.2d 754 (N.J. Essex County Ct. 1948); see also Aronow, 538 A.2d, at 852–53 
(discussing Mate’s introduction of the fault rule and transitioning from the long-standing rule to a 
no-fault approach). 
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On principle, an engagement ring is given, not alone as a symbol of 
the status of the two persons as engaged, the one to the other, but as a 
symbol or token of their pledge and agreement to marry.  As such 
pledge or gift, the condition is implied that if both parties abandon the 
projected marriage, the sole cause of the gift, it should be returned.  
Similarly, if the woman, who has received the ring in token of her 
promise, unjustifiably breaks her promise, it should be returned. 
When the converse situation occurs, and the giver of the ring, 
betokening his promise, violates his word, it would seem that a similar 
result should follow, i.e., he should lose, not gain, rights to the ring.57 
Courts in New Jersey continued to follow the fault approach until 1987, when it 
transitioned to a no-fault approach established in the case Aronow v. Silver.58 
Similar to New Jersey, Connecticut had considered fault in its analysis of 
engagement ring disputes prior to its later transition to the no-fault approach.59  
The 1964 case White v. Finch60 highlights Connecticut’s traditional fault 
approach analysis.61  In White, plaintiff proposed to defendant the day before 
Valentine’s Day, and gave her a diamond ring one week later.62  Within a few 
months, the relationship turned sour and the engagement ended, and both parties 
disagreed on the reasons behind the failed engagement.63 
The court engaged in a detailed analysis of the facts of the case to determine 
which party was at fault in the engagement’s termination.64  Ultimately, the court 
determined that the plaintiff formally ended the engagement, which entitled the 
defendant to keep the engagement ring.65  The court based its inclusion of the 
fault analysis on both Roman and English law, which emphasized the fault of 
each party when resolving a dispute concerning the return of premarital 
                                                            
 57. Mate, 62 A.2d at 754–55 (providing further rationale for this approach by asking “[h]ow, 
on principle, can the courts aid [the potential groom], under such circumstances, to regain a ring 
which he could not regain, had he kept his promise? ‘No man should take advantage of his own 
wrong’”). 
 58. 538 A.2d 851, 854 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987) (abolishing fault in the analysis used 
for New Jersey cases that handle broken engagements). 
 59. Compare White v. Finch, 209 A.2d 199, 201 (Conn. Cir. Ct. 1964) (holding that the 
plaintiff’s calling off the wedding entitled the defendant to keep the engagement ring because “it 
has been held that where an engagement [was] broken owing to the fault of the donor he [could] 
not recover the ring”), with Thorndike, 2007 WL 2363411, at *11 (“We find [the ‘no-fault’] 
approach to be more persuasive” and “consistent with [Connecticut’s] ‘no-fault’ system of 
divorce.”). 
 60. 209 A.2d 199 (Conn. Cir. Ct. 1964). 
 61. Id. at 201. 
 62. Id. at 200 (noting that the plaintiff had also proposed prior to Christmas, but the defendant 
had turned him down, saying that she “wanted ‘to think it over’”). 
 63. Id. at 200–01. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 201 (“Whatever words were spoken and whatever action was taken to terminate the 
engagement were spoken and taken by the plaintiff.”). 
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property.66 Consequently, the court held that the weight of the evidence and 
credibility tipped in favor of the defendant, allowing her to keep the ring because 
it was her ex-fiancé’s fault that the marriage did not occur.67 
Unlike courts in Connecticut and New Jersey, Missouri courts continue to use 
fault analysis in their determination of the division of premarital property.68  
Clippard v. Pfefferkorn,69  a 2005 case before the Missouri Court of Appeals, 
serves as a recent example of a Missouri court utilizing the fault approach in the 
engagement ring arena.70  In Pfefferkorn, Clippard and Pfefferkorn dated for four 
to five months before Clippard proposed to Pfefferkorn two days prior to 
Christmas with a diamond ring worth $13,500.71  Clippard ended the 
engagement six weeks later, believing that his fiancée was not the right person 
for him, but Pfefferkorn refused to return the ring.72  Clippard filed suit, but the 
court held that Pfefferkorn was entitled to keep the ring because the engagement 
ended due to no fault of her own.73  Pfefferkorn stands as a rare case where the 
court expressly asserted that Missouri uses a fault-based approach and then 
followed the corresponding methodology, compared to courts in other states that 
simply analyze the facts to determine which party was at fault without stating 
the test to be used.74 
                                                            
 66. See id. (“The prevailing view in the United States and England follows the Roman Law 
in placing weight upon the fault of the parties.”).  See also Schultz v. Duitz, 69 S.W.2d 27, 30 (Ky. 
1934) (discussing ancient case law and modern English law to find “without precedent of authority, 
a sense of right, fair play, and justice forbids [the court]” from giving the ring back to the donor 
when the donor ended the engagement). 
 67. White, 209 A.2d at 201 (“No words could have been more distinct, more unequivocal than 
the plaintiff’s: ‘As far as I am concerned, the engagement is through.’”). 
 68. See Clippard v. Pfefferkorn, 168 S.W.3d 616, 619–20 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that 
a fiancée was entitled to keep her engagement ring and expressly reiterating that “[i]n cases 
concerning gifts made in contemplation of marriage, Missouri courts have utilized a fault-based 
approach when applying the conditional gift rule to determine which party is entitled to the 
property”). 
 69. 168 S.W.3d 616 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005). 
 70. Id. at 619. 
 71. Id. at 617. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 616, 620.  The court also noted that the “[p]laintiff breached his promise to marry” 
his fiancée by ending his engagement to her.  Id. at 620.  This fact benefitted the defendant’s case 
because, if the plaintiff “had not breached his promise,” but, instead, married the defendant, she 
would surely “have been entitled to retain the ring as her own non-marital property.”  Id. 
 74. Id. at 620 (“[W]e hold that in light of . . . Missouri’s fault-based approach to the recovery 
of or retaining of conditional gifts made in contemplation of marriage, [the donee] is entitled to 
retain the ring.”).  The Pfefferkorn court also analyzed the fact that the ring was given so close to 
Christmas, but, ultimately, found it was given solely as an engagement ring.  Id. 
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Illinois has consistently taken a fault approach when determining the division 
of premarital property.75  In Kosco v. Giacone,76  a recent Illinois Appellate 
Court case, the court effectively highlighted its application.77  The plaintiff, Paul 
Kosco, attempted to recover the engagement ring he had given to his ex-fiancée, 
Cynthia Giacone, by filing an action in replevin against her.78  Giacone testified 
that she and Kosco had gone shopping for engagement rings and talked about 
getting married prior to Kosco’s proposal on Christmas Eve in 2010.79  Kosco 
and Giacone ended their engagement by August 2011, but conflicting testimony 
existed as to which party officially called it off.80 
Giacone argued that she was entitled to keep the ring because it was a 
combined birthday and Christmas gift and they had both decided to end the 
engagement.81  Kosco testified that he was entitled to receive the ring because 
Giacone was the party who ended the engagement and Kosco had intended the 
gift purely for engagement purposes, as evidenced when he “got down on one 
knee and proposed.”82 
Kosco serves as a prime example of the difficult determinations that courts 
face when utilizing a fault-based approach.  The Illinois Court of Appeals, 
handcuffed by its fault-based inquiry, was forced to wade through a plethora of 
conflicting testimony to reach a final conclusion.83  Ultimately, the court held 
that the weight of the evidence suggested that Kosco intended the ring to be an 
engagement ring, not a dual-purpose ring, and that Giacone was seemingly more 
                                                            
 75. See, e.g., Kosco v. Giacone, No. 5-12-0483, 2013 WL 4041043, at *1 (Ill. App. Ct. Aug. 
8, 2013) (holding that “[t]he trial court’s determination that the plaintiff was entitled to the return 
of an engagement ring was not against the manifest weight of the evidence where there was 
sufficient evidence to support a finding that the defendant broke the engagement and wrongfully 
detained the ring.”); Harris v. Davis, 487 N.E.2d 1204, 1206 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (ruling that an ex-
fiancée must return the engagement ring to the donor because she ended the engagement and stating 
that “the party who fails to perform on the condition of the gift has no right to property acquired 
under such pretenses”).  But see Vann v. Vehrs, 633 N.E.2d 102, 106 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (holding 
that the donor was entitled to the engagement ring because neither party was at fault in the 
engagement’s termination). 
 76. No. 5-12-0483, 2013 WL 4041043 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013). 
 77. Id. at *9 (holding that the defendant had to return the engagement ring to the plaintiff 
because the weight of the evidence supported the finding that she had broken off the engagement). 
 78. Id. at *1. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at *2, 4–5. 
 81. Id. at *2, *6–7.  While Giacone testified that Kosco gave her the ring as a “combined [ ] 
birthday and Christmas gift,” Kosco testified that this was impossible because her birthday was in 
April. Id. at *2. 
 82. Id. at *6.  The court stated that even if the proposal was made on Christmas Eve, “[i]t is 
not the occasion on which the ring [was] given that determine[d] whether the ring [was] an 
engagement ring or a gift, it [was] whether the ring [was] given in contemplation of marriage.”  Id. 
 83. See id. at *5–9 (basing the courts determination on a very fact-dependent analysis). 
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at fault than Kosco in the engagement’s termination.84  Therefore, the court 
affirmed the lower court’s order that granted the ring to Kosco.85 
These cases highlight both the successes and failures of the fault-based 
approach.86  However, many state courts have shifted to a no-fault approach, in 
an attempt to correct some of the problems inherent with a fault analysis.87 
2. The No-Fault Approach in Favor of the Donor 
The no-fault approach in favor of the engagement ring’s donor has become 
the majority rule in U.S. jurisdictions.88  Many states that traditionally used a 
fault-based analysis have shifted to using a no-fault methodology89  to counter 
the weaknesses of the fault approach, such as its unpredictability, lack of ease of 
understanding, and its invasion into personal relationships.90  The idea that fault 
can be ascertained in the arena of broken engagements has been heavily 
criticized by many states, and a rule stating that the engagement ring is returned 
to the donor in all instances resolves this concern for the court.91  Further, the 
fault approach has been critiqued as “sexist and . . . a too-long enduring reminder 
of the times when even the law discriminated against women.”92  Finally, the 
rise of no-fault divorces led to an increase in no-fault approaches to broken 
                                                            
 84. Id. at *9. 
 85. Id. 
 86. See infra Part II. 
 87. See infra notes 92–98 and accompanying text (listing the states currently using a no-fault 
approach to resolving engagement ring disputes). 
 88. See Aronow v. Silver, 538 A.2d 851, 853 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987) (describing the 
fault-based rule for determining the party who is entitled to the engagement ring as “archaic”); see 
also Vigil v. Haber, 888 P.2d 455, 457 (N.M. 1994) (“Following a modern trend, legislatures and 
courts have moved toward a policy that removes fault-finding from the personal-relationship 
dynamics of marriage and divorce.”); Crippen v. Campbell, No. E2007-00309-COA-R3-CV, 2007 
WL 2768076, at *1–2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 24, 2007) (rejecting the trial court’s assessment of the 
engagement ring as an irrevocable gift because “cases from other jurisdictions persuade[d] [the 
court] that the clear weight of authority in this country [was] contrary [to that ruling]”); Cotter, 
supra note 24, at 151 (“There are a growing number of jurisdictions that have adopted the no-fault 
rule in recent years, enough so that the no-fault rule can lay claim to now being the majority rule.”). 
 89. See, e.g., Gaden v. Gaden, 272 N.E.2d 471, 475–76 (N.Y. 1971) (“Just as the question of 
fault or guilt has become largely irrelevant to modern divorce proceedings, so should it also be 
deemed irrelevant to the breaking of the engagement.” (citation omitted)). 
 90. See infra Part II (describing and providing examples of the fault approach’s weaknesses). 
 91. See, e.g., Fierro v. Hoel, 465 N.W.2d 669, 672 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990) (holding that an 
engagement ring was inherently conditional on the impending marriage, and, therefore, a fault 
approach failed on a fundamental level because “[i]f the wedding [was] called off, for whatever 
reason, the gift [was] not capable of becoming a completed gift and [needed to] be returned to the 
donor”); Aronow, 538 A.2d at 853 (ruling that “fault, in an engagement setting, cannot be 
ascertained”). 
 92. Id. (discussing the history of the fault rule as a sexist one, as the fault was always the 
woman’s and recognizing the inherent difficulties in determining who is at fault when an 
engagement is broken). 
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engagements.93  These factors have culminated in the modern trend that favors 
a no-fault approach, currently followed by states such as Iowa,94 Kansas,95 
Michigan,96 Minnesota,97 New Jersey,98 New York,99 Ohio,100 Pennsylvania,101 
South Carolina,102 and Wisconsin.103 
In 1957, Pennsylvania became one of the first states to adopt a no-fault rule 
in Pavlicic v. Vogtsberger.104  While not explicitly establishing a no-fault 
approach, this oft-cited case laid the foundation for states to follow by using the 
                                                            
 93. See Lindh v. Surman, 742 A.2d 643, 646 (Pa. 1999) (“Courts that have applied no-fault 
principles to engagement ring cases have borrowed from the policies of their respective legislatures 
that have moved away from the notion of fault in their divorce statutes.” (citing Vigil, 888 P.2d at 
455; Aronow, 538 A.2d at 854)). 
 94. See Fierro, 465 N.W.2d at 671–72 (analyzing the various flaws in the fault approach and 
concluding a no-fault approach provides a better test to resolve which party keeps the engagement 
ring). 
 95. See Heiman v. Parrish, 942 P.2d 631, 637–38 (Kan. 1997) (differentiating engagement 
suits from divorce suits in the state, and holding that fault was not a determinate factor when 
analyzing the proper owner of an engagement ring). 
 96. See Meyer v. Mitnick, 625 N.W.2d 136, 139 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001) (finding the 
“reasoning of the no-fault cases persuasive,” and holding the donor of ring was entitled to recover 
it from his ex-fiancée). 
 97. See Benassi v. Back & Neck Pain Clinic, Inc., 629 N.W.2d 475, 486 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2001) (“We conclude that because the Minnesota legislature has adopted a no-fault marriage 
dissolution law on the grounds of public policy . . . it is consistent for th[e] court to adopt a no-fault 
approach to the return of an engagement ring.”). 
 98. See Aronow, 538 A.2d at 854 (recognizing that New Jersey law dictates a no-fault 
approach with regards to both engagements and divorce). 
 99. See Lipschutz v. Kiderman, 76 A.D.3d 178, 183 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010) (stating that the 
New York legislature passed a law that expressly mandated that the adjudication of engagement 
property disputes be resolved without taking into account “who [was] responsible for the failure of 
the marriage to go forward”) (citing Gaden v. Gaden, 272 N.E.2d 471, 476 (N.Y. 1971); Gagliardo 
v. Clemente, 580 N.Y.S.2d 278 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992)). 
 100. See McIntire v. Raukhorst, 585 N.E.2d 456, 457–58 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989) (rejecting the 
traditional fault approach in favor of the conditional gift theory, and awarded the ring to the donor 
even though he ended the engagement because the condition of marriage had not been fulfilled). 
 101. See Lindh v. Surman, 742 A.2d 643, 647 (Pa. 1999) (holding that donor of engagement 
ring was required to recover the ring under a no-fault approach and that a strict no-fault approach 
must be followed). 
 102. Campbell v. Robinson, 726 S.E.2d 221, 226 (S.C. Ct. App. 2012) (holding the fault 
approach inapplicable to finding the rightful owner of an engagement ring because no legal standard 
(i.e., the reasonable person) of behavior exists to determine the party at fault). 
 103. See Brown v. Thomas, 379 N.W.2d 868, 873 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985) (“[W]e conclude that 
the public policy embodied in Wisconsin’s no-fault law applies to actions for recovery of gifts 
conditioned on marriage.  Thus, an inquiry as to how the engagement was dissolved is not necessary 
. . . .”). 
 104. 136 A.2d 127 (Pa. 1957). 
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conditional gift approach as a tool to negate fault as a factor in a court’s 
analysis.105  In Pavlicic, Justice Musmanno eloquently stated this proposition: 
A gift given by a man to a woman on condition that she embark on the 
sea of matrimony with him is no different from a gift based on the 
condition that the donee sail on any other sea.  If, after receiving the 
provisional gift, the donee refuses to leave the harbor,—if the anchor 
of contractual performance sticks in the sands of irresolution and 
procrastination—the gift must be restored to the donor.  A fortiori 
would this be true when the donee not only refuses to sail with the 
donor, but, on the contrary, walks up the gangplank of another ship 
arm in arm with the donor’s rival.106 
This court realized the inherent predicament with using the fault approach in 
resolving broken engagement property disputes that centered on engagement 
rings—the fact that the gift was conditional on the assumption that the marriage 
occur.107  Therefore, fault remained a non-issue because the gift in question was 
not complete if the marriage did not occur.108  Subsequent courts agreed that 
there was no room for fault analysis in this legal landscape.109 
New York followed Pennsylvania’s lead in 1971 with regard to pre-marital 
property, utilizing the no-fault approach in Gaden v. Gaden.110  The Gaden court 
established a no-fault policy for New York to follow, stating that “the initial 
intent of the heart balm legislation was to rid the courts of these actions where 
the ‘wounded’ party appear[ed] in court to unfold his or her sorrows before a 
sympathetic jury.”111  Despite the case centering on land acquired during an 
                                                            
 105. Id. at 130–32 (differentiating between actions to recover damages for a broken heart and 
actions to recover property from a broken engagement to allow conditional gift theory to guide the 
legal analysis for the latter). 
 106. Id. at 130. 
 107. Id. at 131–32. 
 108. Id. at 131 (stating that the plaintiff was not suing because of a “broken heart,” but asking 
for items back which he gave with a condition of marriage that never materialized). 
 109. See Thorndike v. Demirs, No. CV055000243S, 2007 WL 2363411, at *10 (Conn. Super. 
Ct. July 26, 2007) (“[T]his court is convinced that the modern no-fault rule is clearly the better rule 
and comports with the modern trends on handling family matters on a no fault basis.”); Fierro v. 
Hoel, 465 N.W.2d 669, 672 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990) (explicitly declining to analyze why the 
engagement was broken); Aronow v. Silver, 538 A.2d 851, 854 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987) 
(“When the promise of marriage was not kept, regardless of fault . . . the ring must be returned to 
[the donor].”). 
 110. 272 N.E.2d 471 (N.Y. 1971). 
 111. Id. at 476.  The Gaden court used public policy methodology to criticize the fault approach 
by contrasting the penalty the fault approach imposed on a party for ending an engagement with 
the purpose of the engagement period to establish “the permanency” of two parties’ feelings for 
each other.  Id.  According to the court, “it would seem highly ironic to penalize the donor for 
taking steps to prevent a possibly unhappy marriage.”  Id.  The court summarized one of the main 
failures of the fault approach, concluding that New York courts “should not impose a fault 
requirement . . . which would only burden our courts with countless tales of broken hearts and 
frustrated dreams.”  Id. (footnote omitted). 
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engagement rather than an engagement ring, the court utilized the legal standard 
from divorce proceedings to solidify the presence of the no-fault approach in 
New York jurisprudence.112 
In 1985, Wisconsin followed Pennsylvania and New York, instituting a no-
fault policy in Brown v. Thomas.113  In Brown, the court analogized Wisconsin 
divorce law to the engagement setting and concluded that “the public policy 
embodied in Wisconsin’s no-fault divorce law applie[d] to actions for recovery 
of gifts conditioned on marriage.”114  Therefore, the court decided that an inquiry 
into the fault of the parties in the terminated engagement was unnecessary.115 
In 1997, Kansas also came down in favor of a no-fault policy, as seen in 
Heiman v. Parrish.116  The undisputed facts indicated that Heiman purchased a 
ring for Parrish and gave it to her “in contemplation of marriage.”117  Heiman 
terminated the engagement, but the parties could not agree on who was to 
blame.118  The court concluded that the no-fault case law was convincing, thus 
Heiman was entitled to the ring because fault was irrelevant in the analysis over 
its ownership.119 
Recently, South Carolina also established a no-fault approach in favor of the 
donor of the engagement ring.  The Court of Appeals of South Carolina decided 
Campbell v. Robinson120 in 2012, holding that “fault does not determine 
ownership of the [engagement] ring.”121  In Campbell, the parties disputed who 
ended the engagement, and the donee testified the donor had told her “she should 
                                                            
 112. Id. at 473, 476. 
 113. 379 N.W.2d 868, 873 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985). 
 114. Id. (citation omitted). 
 115. See id. (“As the record of this two-day jury trial demonstrates, the answer to the multiple 
question ‘who broke off the engagement, when, and was he/she justified?’ is often lost in the murky 
depths of contradictory, acrimonious, and largely irrelevant testimony by disappointed couples, 
their relatives and friends.”).  The Brown court decided the rule set out in Gaden was more equitable 
and realistic.  Id. 
 116. 942 P.2d 631, 632 (Kan. 1997) (holding that fault is irrelevant in determining the rightful 
owner of an engagement ring). 
 117. Id. at 632. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 637–38.  The court in Heiman cites nine instances where an engagement may 
justifiably fail, illustrating the impossibility of determining fault where none may exist: 
(1) The parties have nothing in common; (2) one party cannot stand prospective in-laws; 
(3) a minor child of one of the parties is hostile to and will not accept the other party; (4) 
an adult child of one of the parties will not accept the other party; (5) the parties’ pets do 
not get along; (6) a party was too hasty in proposing or accepting the proposal; (7) the 
engagement was a rebound situation which is now regretted; (8) one party has untidy 
habits that irritate the other; or (9) the parties’ have religious differences. 
Id. 
 120. 726 S.E.2d 221 (S.C. Ct. App. 2012). 
 121. See id. at 225.  Ultimately, the court remanded the case for a new trial because the jury 
had been instructed to consider fault and had found the donor at fault.  Id. at 224–26, 229. 
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keep the ring” but later reneged on his statement.122  The court stated “the 
consideration of fault has no place in determining ownership of an engagement 
ring. Generally, gift law will dictate who has the legal right to the ring.”123  The 
Campbell court wrote that an engagement ring inherently represents a symbol of 
the donor’s love and “devotion to the donee,” but that sentiment is not of legal 
consequence when an engagement ends.124  These cases illustrate the reasons 
behind the rapid movement towards a majority no-fault approach in the United 
States, but an outlier state that favors a no-fault methodology in favor of the 
party who received the engagement ring still remains.125 
3. The No-Fault Approach in Favor of the Donee 
Currently, only Montana follows the no-fault approach in favor of the donee 
when determining which party receives the ring following a broken 
engagement.126  On a case of first impression in 2012, the Montana Supreme 
Court concluded in Albinger v. Harris127  that an engagement ring is an 
irrevocable inter vivos gift by nature and that the donee is entitled to the ring 
regardless of fault.128 
To reach this conclusion, the court analyzed the giving of an engagement ring 
using “[t]he essential elements of an inter vivos gift[—]donative intent, 
voluntary delivery[,] and acceptance by the recipient”—and found each of these 
elements present when a man gives an engagement ring to his betrothed in 
anticipation of marriage.129  The court applied contract law to rationalize its 
ultimate conclusion, finding the promise to marry and the exchange of a ring as 
sufficient consideration to form a binding contract.130  The court also reasoned 
                                                            
 122. Id. at 224. 
 123. Id. at 226.  The court listed four factors that helped advance the no-fault approach: “the 
abolishment of heart balm actions, adoption of no-fault divorce, desire to limit courtroom 
dramatics, and reduction of the difficulty in determining the issue of what constitutes fault in the 
decline of a relationship.”  Id. 
 124. Id. at 225. 
 125. See Albinger v. Harris, 48 P.3d 711, 715-20 (Mont. 2002) (finding that “the engagement 
ring was an unconditional, completed gift upon acceptance”). 
 126. Nina Kotick, Love and the Law, Part I: Does an Engagement Ring Need to be Returned?, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 11, 2011, 9:02 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/nina-kotick/love-
and-the-law-part-i-d_b_76108.html. 
 127. 48 P.3d 711 (Mont. 2002). 
 128. Id. at 720 (“Although the [lower] court implied a condition of marriage attaching to the 
gift as a matter of law, we do not.  In our judgment, the gift was complete upon delivery, and a 
completed gift is not revocable.”). 
 129. Id. at 718–19 (noting that an inter vivos “gift, made without condition, becomes 
irrevocable upon acceptance” and the court “will not void the transfer when the giver experiences 
a change of heart” (citations omitted)).  See also MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-3-101 (West 2013) (“A 
gift is a transfer of personal property made voluntarily and without consideration.”). 
 130. Albinger, 48 P.3d at 719 (“When an engagement ring is given as consideration for the 
promise to marry, a contract is formed and legal action to recover the ring is barred by the abolition 
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that the no-fault approach in favor of the donor, used by the majority of states, 
heavily favors “the benefit of predominantly male plaintiffs.”131  According to 
the court, this donor-favored approach prolongs the gender bias that legislatures 
nationwide have attempted to abolish with the repeal of breach-of-promise 
statutes.132  Ultimately, the court concluded that “the engagement ring was an 
unconditional, completed gift upon acceptance and [should] remain[] in [the 
donee’s] ownership and control.”133  Montana remains the only state to have a 
bright-line rule favoring a donee’s ring retention regardless of fault.134 
II. EVALUATING THE RESPECTIVE SUCCESSES AND FAILURES OF THE FAULT 
AND NO-FAULT APPROACHES TO RESOLVING BROKEN ENGAGEMENT 
LAWSUITS 
A. The Fault Approach, Depsite Its Benefits, Fails to Account for Its Many 
Weaknesses to be a Sufficient Workable Solution 
1. The Successes of the Fault Approach 
The appeal of the fault approach lies in its admirable attempt to determine the 
“correct” and rightful recipient of premarital property when a marriage fails to 
occur.135  States that use the fault approach reason that, based on the conditional 
gift status of an engagement ring, whichever party chose not to meet this 
condition should not be unjustly enriched by taking ownership of the valuable 
item.136  In Clippard v. Pfefferkorn, the court held, in relevant part: 
[Pfefferkorn] was entitled to retain the ring because, by terminating 
the engagement, [Clippard] breached his promise to marry 
[Pfefferkorn].  [Clippard]’s proposal of marriage and giving of the ring 
and [Pfefferkorn]’s acceptance of the ring and proposal was symbolic 
of their . . . intention to marry.  If [Clippard] had not breached his 
promise to marry [Pfefferkorn] and the marriage had taken place, there 
                                                            
of the breach of promise actions.”) (citing MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 27-1-412(2), 27-1-602 (West 
2013)). 
 131. Id. at 725 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 132. Id. at 720 (“If this Court were to fashion a special exception for engagement ring actions 
under gift law theories, we would perpetuate the gender bias attendant upon the Legislature’s 
decision to remove from our courts all actions for breach of antenuptial promises.”). 
 133. Id. 
 134. Cotter, supra note 24, at 154 (“In one bold action, the [Montana Supreme Court] declared 
its independence from the rest of the country . . . when it determined that engagement rings are 
completed gifts upon receipt by the donee . . . .”). 
 135. See Lindh v. Surman, 742 A.2d 643, 645–46 (Pa. 1999) (noting the fault approach’s 
“appeal[] to [one’s] sense of equity”). 
 136. See Clippard v. Pfefferkorn, 168 S.W.3d 616, 620 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005) (explaining the 
rationale for the fault-based approach seeking to find the just result). 
482 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 64:463 
is no question that [Pfefferkorn] would have been entitled to retain the 
ring as her own non-marital property.137 
This well-meaning intention—to seek the truth behind the broken 
engagement—has roots in both equity and conditional gift theory.138  As the 
court discussed in White v. Finch, the fault approach based its origins in 
traditional beliefs about the symbol of the engagement ring and the history 
surrounding courts’ understanding of promises to marry.139  Furthermore, 
society’s progression no longer requires a woman to rely on the promise of 
marriage as a vehicle for success in her life, eliminating that rationale for this 
approach.140  Therefore, the costly difficulties in applying this approach 
outweigh its intended benefits.141 
2. Failure of the Fault Approach 
Although the fault approach’s attempt to achieve equity appears reasonable, 
it remains unrealistic and unworkable.142  Strikingly similar to making a 
determination regarding fault in a marriage’s failure, courts find it nearly 
impossible to correctly determine fault when an engagement fails.143  The 
                                                            
 137. Id. (citing Smith v. Smith, 797 S.W.2d 879, 881 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990)). 
 138. See Blecher, supra note 9, at 582–84 (tracing the history of engagement ring disputes from 
attempting to find an equitable result through heartbalm legislation to grounding the case in 
conditional gift theory). 
 139. See White v. Finch, 209 A.2d 199, 202 (Conn. Cir. Ct. 1964) (outlining the development 
of the fault approach). 
 140. See Aronow v. Silver, 538 A.2d 851, 853 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987) (“To accept the 
[fault approach] is to ignore our constitutional insistence upon the equality of women, to further 
unfortunate reality that society still discriminates.  That reality is one which courts must not 
promote.  Our obligation is to enforce the law, which bars discrimination.  By doing so we move 
reality in the right direction.”); see also KELSO, supra note 38, § 2:17 (“Attitudes about gender, 
employment, courtship, marriage, and divorce have undergone fundamental transformation.  In 
contexts where they were once insulated from liability, people are now expected to bear greater 
responsibility for the impact of their conduct on members of the opposite sex.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 141. See Fowler v. Perry, 830 N.E.2d 97, 106 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (“We do not want to require 
our judiciary to tackle the seemingly insurmountable task of determining which party was at fault 
for the termination of an engagement for marriage, as such may force trial courts to sort through 
volumes of self-serving testimony regarding who-did-what during the engagement.”); Aronow, 538 
A.2d at 853 (rejecting the fault-based approach based on the constitutional problems over the 
equality of women it perpetuates); Vigil v. Haber, 888 P.2d 455, 457 (N.M. 1994) (recognizing the 
difficulty in determining fault in broken engagements). 
 142. See Benassi v. Back & Neck Pain Clinic, Inc., 629 N.W.2d 475, 485 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2001) (discussing the difficulties and inherent problems in applying a fault analysis, and  
Wisconsin’s rationale for abandoning the fault approach, which stated that “[[t]he question of who 
is at fault often becomes] lost in the murky depths of contradictory, acrimonious, and largely 
irrelevant testimony by disappointed couples, their relatives and friends.” (alteration in original) 
(quoting Brown v. Thomas, 379 N.W.2d 868, 873 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
 143. See Aronow, 538 A.2d at 854 (focusing on the relationship between divorce law and failed 
engagement law); see also David Paul Horowitz, Burden of Proof, 82 N.Y. ST. B.A.J. 18, 18 (2010) 
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lengthy and daunting investigation needed to correctly discern the wrongful 
party expends the court’s resources and may not lead to the “correct” answer, 
which leaves the court with a lack of clarity when making the determination as 
to who it believes more.144 
This approach also fails to define “fault” in the context of determining which 
party is the cause of a broken engagement.145  The type of “fault” referred to by 
parties is neither explicit nor advanced by states that follow this approach.146  
The ability to prove who is at fault grows exceedingly difficult as situations arise 
where the termination of the engagement is justified and neither party is to 
blame.147  Continuing to try to determine the true party at fault would not only 
be onerous but risky, because a potential likelihood exists that courts may hold 
the wrong party accountable.148 
Perhaps the public policy issues that could arise from its introduction exhibit 
the most damaging failures of the fault-approach.149  This approach grants the 
courts unfettered ability to dissect parties’ personal lives and romantic 
relationships,150 and most Americans do not want the legal system digging 
through and sorting out these private intimacies for them.151 
                                                            
(discussing New York as being the last state to a enact no-fault divorce statute, and the 
consequences of litigating fault-divorce proceedings). 
 144. Cotter, supra note 24, at 149 (“These [fault] states still require an investigation into the 
messy question of who was responsible for the deterioration of the relationship and the ultimate 
termination of the engagement.”). 
 145. See Carroll v. Curry, 912 N.E.2d 272, 279 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009) (citing Elaine Marie 
Tomko, Annotation, Rights in Respect of Engagement and Courtship Presents When Marriage 
Does Not Ensue, 44 A.L.R.5th 1 (1996)) (“Discrepancy in the use of the term ‘fault’ is common in 
engagement ring cases.”). 
 146. Id. at 279 (“In some cases, a party is ‘at fault’ for the termination of an engagement when 
his or her acts conclusively end the planned nuptials; in other cases, the terminology ‘at fault’ refers 
to the actions of the party whose conduct is the underlying cause for the engagement ending.” 
(citing Tomko, supra note 145, at 1)). 
 147. See Heiman v. Parrish, 942 P.2d 631, 637 (Kan. 1997) (listing various ways in which a 
broken engagement could be justified). 
 148. See Patterson v. Blanton, 672 N.E.2d 208, 210 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996) (determining that a 
no-fault rule “eliminate[d] the need for a trial court to engage in the often impossible task of 
establishing blame in the emotionally complex context of an engagement to be married,” and, 
consequently, embracing the no-fault rule in all suits regarding the division of premarital property).  
By labeling the undertaking of establishing fault as “often impossible,” the Ohio Court of Appeals 
displayed its reluctance to attempt the task, for fear of finding fault with the incorrect party.  Id. 
 149. See Aronow v. Silver, 538 A.2d 851, 854 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987) (agreeing that 
the policy for eliminating no-fault divorces similarly applied to eliminating no-fault engagements); 
see also Heiman, 942 P.2d at 638 (denouncing the fault-based approach because engagements 
should be a time of reflection before making the marital commitment). 
 150. See Brown v. Thomas, 379 N.W.2d 868, 873 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985) (stating that 
determining who is at fault is often “lost in the murky depths of contradictory, acrimonious, and 
largely irrelevant testimony by disappointed couples, their relatives and friends”). 
 151. Samantha Barbas, Saving Privacy From History, 61 DEPAUL L. REV. 973, 976–79 (2012) 
(discussing the “right to privacy” most Americans feel is an inherent right that all citizens should 
be afforded).  Barbas outlines the dwindling amount of privacy in Americans’ daily lives, which 
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The fault approach, by penalizing the party who ended the relationship, can 
also deter parties from ending an engagement for good cause.152  Society as a 
whole benefits if a couple, or one member of, realizes their relationship will not 
succeed for any number of reasons and breaks the engagement before the law 
forever ties them together in marriage.153 
Lastly, the fault approach fails because it cannot be reconciled with the 
legislature’s abolishment of the breach-of-promise statutes.154  The heartbalm 
statues were enacted to eradicate jilted lovers from turning their personal lives 
into courtroom drama, and the fault approach encourages such behavior.155 
Kosco exemplifies the challenging and time-consuming judgments that courts 
must make when using a fault-based approach.  The court in Kosco spent six 
pages of its opinion analyzing the multiple accusations of maltreatment by the 
opposing parties to attempt to ascertain the party at fault.156  Furthermore, all of 
the court’s analysis lacks any significance if the court fails to employ the correct 
definition of fault, or simply comes to the incorrect conclusion.157 
B. The No-Fault Approach in Favor of the Donor is Preferable to Both a Fault 
Analysis and No-Fault Analysis in Favor of the Donee 
1. Benefits of the No-Fault Approach 
Primarily, the no-fault approach in favor of the donor of pre-marital property 
provides courts with a bright-line rule to use when determining broken 
engagement suits.158  A no-fault approach “eliminates the need for a trial court 
to attempt the often impossible task of determining which, if either, party is at 
fault.”159  The bright-line rule of the no-fault approach makes it significantly 
                                                            
supports the proposition that the courts should not be another entity that seeks to investigate 
citizens’ private lives, given the general lack of privacy in society.  Id. 
 152. See Gaden v. Gaden, 272 N.E.2d 471, 476 (N.Y. 1971) (highlighting the irony of 
punishing the donor because, “in one sense[,] the engagement period [was] successful if the 
engagement [was] broken since one of the parties ha[d] wisely utilized this time so as to avoid a 
marriage that in all probability would fail”). 
 153. Id. (noting the lack of true fault that accompanies most broken engagements). 
 154. See id. (refusing to impute a fault requirement into the state heartbalm statute where the 
legislature had not explicitly included one). 
 155. Id. (determining that the heartbalm statutes were intended “to rid the courts of these 
actions where the ‘wounded’ party appear[ed] in court to unfold his or her sorrow before a 
sympathetic jury”). 
 156. See Kosco v. Giacone, No. 5-12-0483, 2013 WL 4041043, at *1-6 (Ill. App. Ct. Aug. 8, 
2013). 
 157. See supra notes 143–48 and accompanying text. 
 158. Patterson v. Blanton, 672 N.E.2d 208, 212 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996) (concluding that the 
difficulties intrinsic to determining fault led the court to adopt a no-fault approach, which included 
a bright-line rule to “avoid straying into a legal swamp by declining to undertake a determination 
of who may be at fault in terminating an engagement”); see also McIntire v. Raukhorst, 585 N.E.2d 
456, 458 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989) (stating the “bright line” nature of the no-fault approach). 
 159. McIntire, 585 N.E.2d at 458. 
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easier for courts to decide which party is legally entitled to the engagement 
ring.160  This approach also more closely aligns with conditional gift law, which 
only maintains the gift’s revocability if the condition of marriage is not met.161 
2. The Downside to the No-Fault Approach 
The central failure of the no-fault approach lies in its inability to reconcile its 
methodology with society’s desire for equity and justice.162  A bright-line rule 
mandating the engagement ring’s return to the donor allows courts to ignore 
evidence of the donor’s conceivably reprehensible behavior when determining 
that the donee may not keep the ring.163 
Another argument posits that the no-fault rule is unfairly prejudicial to 
women.164  Women and their families often expend the most money on wedding 
preparations, but women are not entitled to restitution of expenses paid in no-
fault jurisdictions if the wedding does not occur as a result of the donor’s 
behavior, despite the donor’s entitlement to the engagement ring.165  While these 
downfalls to a no-fault approach exist and appear troublesome, incorporating an 
exception for unconscionable circumstances into the methodology can alleviate 
many of the complications. 
                                                            
 160. See supra note 91 and accompanying text; see also Campbell v. Robinson, 726 S.E.2d 
221, 226 (S.C. Ct. App. 2012) (holding that because “no legal standard exists by which a fact finder 
can adjudge culpability or fault in a prenuptial breakup,” fault should not play a role in ascertaining 
who is entitled to the ring). 
 161. See Fierro v. Hoel, 465 N.W.2d 669, 672 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990) (determining that fault 
has no place in the analysis because an engagement ring is a symbolic item that is fundamentally 
conditioned upon marriage and requires conditional gift law to resolve the dispute). 
 162. See Carl E. Schneider, Marriage, Morals, and the Law: No-Fault Divorce and Moral 
Discourse, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 503, 556 (1994) (arguing that the no-fault legal theory of divorce 
and engagement law has left courts with unsatisfactory and impractical legal theories and 
solutions); Tushnet, supra note 15, at 2617 (“No fault regimes . . . exclude even the most awful 
behavior from consideration, so that physical abuse—even attempted murder—does not affect 
property division upon divorce, a conclusion that seems perverse.  People have a persistent need to 
make fault judgments, a need that is particularly powerful when a court is forced to decide how 
property should be divided.” (footnote omitted)). 
 163. See Tushnet, supra note 15, at 2617 (discussing the no fault approach’s effect on judicial 
analyses in property division cases). 
 164. Id. at 2614 (“The current interpretation of antiheartbalm laws is inequitable because it 
makes women vulnerable to economic loss at the end of an engagement even when men break their 
promises.”); see also Albinger v. Harris, 48 P.2d 711, 719–20 (Mont. 2002) (describing how the 
no-fault rule in favor of the donor perpetuates gender bias against women). 
 165. See Tushnet, supra note 15, at 2610–11 (“While a man can, in many states, regain his ring 
whenever an engagement ends, a woman cannot recover expenses for a wedding she has 
painstakingly arranged; not only may she be abandoned at the altar in front of friends and family, 
she (and her family) will have to pay for the costs of the nonexistent celebration.  Lawsuits for 
recovery of expenses not directed to the defendant, but made in preparation for marriage (for 
example, travel to a fiancé’s residence or a wedding dress), though simple to measure in monetary 
terms, have generally been held to be prohibited by antiheartbalm laws.”) 
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III. COURTS NATIONWIDE SHOULD ADOPT THE NO-FAULT RULE WITH 
EXCEPTIONS FOR EGREGIOUS CONDUCT AND EXTREME CIRCUMSTANCES SO 
ALL PARTIES INVOLVED CAN PREDICT OUTCOMES AND EXPECT JUSTICE 
Each of the three approaches utilized by courts in the fifty states has its 
advantages and disadvantages, but one of the fundamental flaws in the system is 
a lack of uniformity.166  A consistent nationwide standard would allow couples 
to know what will happen if either party terminates the engagement prior to 
marriage no matter where the couple is located.  This uniform standard may help 
couples avoid a lengthy and costly divorce in the future by providing the 
opportunity for any party who feels uncomfortable about the impending 
marriage to end the engagement with knowledge about the likely outcome of the 
engagement ring.167 
The nationwide approach should be based on the no-fault rule already used by 
a majority of states.168  This rule’s level of predictability, efficiency, and equity 
protects the privacy interests of parties involved.169  The approach that should 
be adopted nationwide is based on the rule Kansas elucidated in Heiman v. 
Parrish. 
The court in Heiman adopted a no-fault approach in favor of the engagement 
ring’s donor that left room for exceptional circumstances that would warrant the 
return of the ring to the donor unconscionable.170  This policy maintains the no-
fault approach’s predictability and efficiency, while allowing for exceptions in 
extreme situations.171  It would be against public policy and the intent of the law 
to return the ring to the donor when that donor has admitted to infidelity, or when 
the donee has spent thousands of dollars on the wedding to then have her fiancé 
end the relationship and retake the ring without reimbursing her for any 
                                                            
 166. See Tomko, supra note 145, Part II.A (listing the multitude of legal theories states use to 
determine the division of premarital property if the marriage does not result from the engagement). 
 167. See supra notes 143–48 and accompanying text (discussing the different definitions of 
fault and unclear details about personal relationships courts look to that lead to confusing and 
unclear precedent). 
 168. See supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
 169. See Aronow v. Silver, 538 A.2d 851, 854–55 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987) (discussing 
the difficulty for courts to find fault with only one party in a broken engagement and the foundation 
in equity that the no-fault approach brings to such cases); Gaden v. Gaden, 272 N.E.2d 471, 476 
(N.Y. 1971) (finding that most broken engagements have no one person at fault); Lindh v. Surman, 
742 A.2d 643, 645–46 (Pa. 1999) (“A no-fault approach . . . involves no investigation into the 
motives or reasons for the cessation of the engagement and requires the return of the engagement 
ring simply upon the nonoccurrence of the marriage.”). 
 170. Heiman v. Parrish, 942 P.2d 631, 638 (Kan. 1997) (“Ordinarily, the ring should be 
returned to the donor, regardless of fault. . . .  [But] we recognize there may be ‘extremely gross 
and rare situations’ where fault might be appropriately considered.”). 
 171. Id. (recognizing the utility of the engagement period to test a relationship and the 
flexibility of allowing a justified rationale for terminating an engagement). 
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expenses.172  This approach preserves the advantages of the no-fault approach, 
but still appreciates the necessity of equity in extreme situations.173 
Although this approach considers unconscionability in some cases, it does not 
suggest an unconscionability analysis in every case.174  An unconscionability 
analysis may too closely resemble the fault analysis and may appear to 
undermine the no-fault approach.  Therefore, its use must apply only to those 
scenarios in which severe inequity is readily apparent, so as not to invite the 
inefficient, lengthy litigation that this approach seeks to avoid.175 
Consequently, the enactment of a uniform non-strict, no-fault approach, 
tempered by a limited exception for unconscionable fact patterns, would be the 
preferred method to resolve the issues surrounding the division of premarital 
property.  State courts or legislatures could implement this approach, rather than 
implementation through the judicial system. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The various state approaches to broken engagement lawsuits have led to 
confusion and misunderstanding in the law with regard to which area of law to 
use and how to apply it.  The traditional fault approach, currently the minority 
methodology, fails to adequately achieve the fair and equitable result it seeks.  
Despite its downfalls, the no-fault analysis provides a preferable approach to the 
fault method, due to its consistency, efficiency, and positive effect on public 
policy.  The adoption of a uniform, non-strict no-fault rule in favor of the donor 
of an engagement ring—one in which, except for extreme, exigent 
circumstances, the donor is entitled to the return of the ring regardless of fault—
will create a just, efficient, and rational solution. 
If Kim Kardashian had fought for her engagement ring in her home state of 
California, the court would have followed its traditional fault approach—
analyzing any potential wrongdoing in the relationship to determine who was 
entitled to the multi-million dollar sparkler.  This approach could have led to the 
publicizing of personal details of Kim and Kris’ life that they may prefer be left 
out of the public arena.  Their famous “love” story operates as a paradigm for 
                                                            
 172. See Lindh, 742 A.2d at 648 (Cappy, J., dissenting) (“I can envision a scenario whereby 
the prospective bride and her family have expended thousands of dollars in preparation for the 
[wedding] and she is, through no fault of her own, left standing at the altar holding the caterer’s 
bill.  To add insult to injury, the majority would also strip her of her engagement ring.”). 
 173. See Heiman, 942 P.2d at 638 (noting that fault generally should not play a role in 
engagement ring determinations). 
 174. See id. (lacking any mention of specific examples of “‘extremely gross and rare situations’ 
where fault might be appropriately considered”). 
 175. See, e.g., Fowler v. Perry, 830 N.E.2d 97, 106 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (adopting a no-fault 
approach because a fault analysis may waste time and money by forcing courts to wade through 
“volumes of self-serving testimony” in order to determine the truly wronged party, and because a 
no-fault approach recognizes the purpose of the engagement period and better reflects the state’s 
divorce methodology).  See also Heiman, 942 P.2d at 638 (reserving the fault analysis only for 
extreme circumstances of unjust behavior). 
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the benefits of the proposed solution of a uniform no-fault approach, because a 
court would not have to spend its already limited time examining each messy 
issue in the failed relationship of these two persons.  A standardized no-fault 
approach, with exceptions for unconscionable scenarios, would, at the very least, 
give the Kris Humphries of the world peace of mind when contemplating a 
marriage proposal. 
